The effects of local socio-political events on group cohesion in online far-right communities by Bliuc, Ana-Maria et al.
                                                                    
University of Dundee
The effects of local socio-political events on group cohesion in online far-right
communities









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bliuc, A-M., Betts, J. M., Faulkner, N., Vergani, M., Chow, R. J., Iqbal, M., & Best, D. (2020). The effects of local
socio-political events on group cohesion in online far-right communities. PLoS ONE, 15(3), 1-18. [e0230302].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 28. Apr. 2020
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The effects of local socio-political events on
group cohesion in online far-right
communities
Ana-Maria BliucID1☯*, John M. Betts2☯, Nicholas FaulknerID3, Matteo Vergani4, Rui
Jie Chow2, Muhammad Iqbal5, David Best6☯
1 Department of Psychology, University of Dundee, Dundee, United Kingdom, 2 Faculty of Information
Technology, Monash University, Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 3 Behaviour Works, Monash University,
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 4 Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalisation, Deakin University,
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 5 Institute for Sustainable Industries & Liveable Cities, Victoria University,
Melbourne, Victoria, Australia, 6 Department of Criminology, University of Derby, Derby, United Kingdom
☯ These authors contributed equally to this work.
* abliuc001@dundee.ac.uk
Abstract
In recent years, the reach and influence of far-right ideologies have been extended through
online communities with devastating effects in the real world. In this research, we examine
how far-right online communities can be empowered by socio-political events that are signif-
icant to them. Using over 14 years of data extracted from an Australian national sub-forum
of a global online white supremacist community, we investigate whether the group cohesion
of the community is affected by local race riots. Our analysis shows that the online commu-
nity, not only became more cohesive after the riots, but was also reinvigorated by highly
active new members who joined during the week of the riots or soon after. These changes
were maintained over the longer-term, highlighting pervasive ramifications of the local
socio-political context for this white supremacist community. Pre-registered analyses of
data extracted from other white supremacist online communities (in South Africa and the
United Kingdom) show similar effects on some of the indicators of group cohesion, but of
reduced magnitude, and not as enduring as the effects found in the context of the Australian
far-right online community.
Introduction
Far-right political groups have been entering the mainstream of politics in many Western
nations, arguably aided by a political climate dominated by mistrust, intergroup tensions, and
increasing authoritarian attitudes [1–4]. More general support for the far-right movement,
however, has been boosted by online communities of activists. Such communities are danger-
ous, not only because they undermine trust, create division, and increase intergroup tensions
in society, but also because they provide isolated extremists with virtual communities of sup-
port. For example, Stormfront, one of the largest and most influential white supremacist online
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communities in the world—with over 300,000 registered members and more than one million
visitors each month [5], has likely empowered ‘lone wolves’ such as the Norwegian right-wing
extremist, Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011 [6] and who at the time of
the killings was a registered member [7]. More recently, the perpetrator of the 2019 Christ-
church mosques attacks in New Zealand responsible of 50 deaths, was at least partially radical-
ised online with social commentators making direct links between engagement with online
far-right communities and the political violence perpetrated ‘in real life’ [8]. Given the growing
influence that online far-right communities can wield in a technologically networked world [9,
10], we seek to investigate how such groups might become more cohesive, and therefore, more
influential in society. In particular, we focus on examining how the internal cohesion of partic-
ular far-right online communities may be affected by offline socio-political events of signifi-
cance to these communities.
Theoretical background
Group cohesion in offline groups and online communities
Research on small group dynamics shows that groups become more cohesive in the aftermath
of specific events primarily because group members come to perceive these events as collective
achievements or group successes [11–13]. Perceptions of group success may lead to a stronger
sense of social identification with the group and thus increase group members’ perceptions of
collective efficacy [14, 15]. Also, according to self-categorization theory [16–17], increased
group cohesion can occur as a direct result of a specific collective identity being activated (or
made salient) by contextual changes such as particular socio-political events driven by inter-
group conflict. Intergroup conflict highlights self-categorizations in terms of ‘us versus them’
and socio-political events underpinned by such conflict can provide the group with clearer
goals, a shared vision, and prescribe clear guidelines for behaviours in alignment with the
group norms [18, 19]. Moreover, the specific conditions created by intergroup conflict may
help opposing groups identify more clearly their respective group’s enemy and thus provide a
highly specific basis for identity formation, increased identification with the group [20, 21],
and unified action to achieve group goals. For example, the dynamics that may drive group
cohesion within groups in conflict are well illustrated by clashes between protesters and
counter-protesters in political demonstrations where markers of both group identity (what
unifies the group) and outgroup differentiation (what sets the groups apart) are clearly dis-
played and strategically used. Such conflictual interactions tend to further accentuate the dif-
ferences between ingroup and outgroup members, or in theoretical terms, increase the meta-
contrast between the opposing groups [22]. The accentuation of group differences in a situa-
tion of intergroup conflict can, in turn, lead to stronger group identification and an increased
sense of solidarity between group members on both sides [23].
In the current research, we seek to test whether the social psychological processes underpin-
ning group cohesion (previously tested in small groups and different types of teams) apply to
online far-right communities. Drawing on these theoretical points, we propose that socio-
political events which are a) significant to online far-right communities, b) perceived as
ingroup achievements, and c) driven by intergroup conflict, can strengthen these communities
by increasing their internal cohesion.
Online communities can be seen as psychological groups in the sense that being a member
of such groups is conducive to a psychological state of togetherness and belongingness even
when members are not together in a physical space [17]. As with all social groups, online com-
munities are based on shared social norms and values, and even more so than face-to-face
groups, they are formed to enable and support the continuous consensualisation of attitudes
PLOS ONE Group cohesion in online far-right communities
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302 March 30, 2020 2 / 18
and values. In this way, validation and intragroup influence, the two processes that directly
affect the group structure, are achieved through mutual interaction [17].
If we think of group structure as a dynamic concept incorporating social interactions and
relationships between group members within their group (intragroup processes), then the ‘dig-
ital footprint’ of members of an online far-right community represents a particularly rich data
source. We consider several aspects of the intragroup dynamics as indicators of group cohesion,
a socio-psychological construct first defined by Festinger in the 1950s to refer to those forces
acting on group members to stay in the group [24]. Later definitions refer to group cohesion as
a property derived from the strength of mutual positive relationships between group members
[25] or as a dynamic process reflected in the tendency of a group to stick together in the pur-
suit of its goals [26]. In small group research, group cohesion has been related to levels of
group performance [11, 12], while in studies of online communities, it has been associated
with increased commitment and loyalty to these communities [27–29].
Classic research in social psychology treats an individual’s attraction to the group as the
essential aspect of group cohesion [30]. However, conceptualisations of cohesion which pre-
dominantly rely on intragroup attraction are now seen as reductionist because they overlook
other fundamental assumptions that underlie the nature of social groups [31]. More current
conceptualisations treat group cohesion as a multidimensional construct which can be cap-
tured by both group members’ beliefs about attraction to the group, and levels of group integra-
tion. According to these definitions, attraction to the group refers to members’ perceptions
about the capacity of the group to satisfy personal needs and objectives [26]. Thus, it encapsu-
lates personal motivations and feelings about staying in the group. Group integration, on the
other hand, refers to members’ closeness, bonding, and degree of unification within the group.
The distinction between attraction to group and group integration represents the basis of an
operational conceptualisation which was used to develop (widely used) self-report measures of
group cohesion in sports teams, but with a broader applicability to other types of groups [26].
In our research, we adopt and build on these operational conceptualisations to investigate
variations in levels of group cohesion in several national sub-forums of the global online white
supremacist community Stormfront.org. To capture group cohesion in this context, we exam-
ine indicators derived from conceptualisations of group cohesion as encompassing both
attraction to the group and group interaction. Self-report measures of group cohesion applied
to small groups (that is, The Group Environment Questionnaire, 26), include sub-scales of
attraction to the group and group interaction which refer to both the group (social dimen-
sions) and the task (instrumental dimensions). Because our study groups are online communi-
ties where interactions between group members occur via online exchanges and there are no
set group tasks to be accomplished (thus differing in significant ways from small teams in
sporting or organisational contexts), we only use those indicators which are expected to cap-
ture the social dimensions of group cohesion. As our study focuses on an online community,
we use members’ levels of individual connections to other group members to capture attrac-
tion to the group (inter-member attraction). Based on its operational definition, we consider
group integration as being indicated by members’ levels of bonding and unification of the
group, and we consider engagement of group members with the online community as encap-
sulating closeness between members (i.e., developing familiarity or a desire to increased inter-
action). Thus, the indicators of group integration that we use are:
a. Bonding, as connections between the most committed members of the group or the most
active members on the forum;
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b. Unification, as the number of members that interact directly under a common thread (that
is, members discussing the same topic reflecting a consolidation of ideas within the online
community); and
c. Engagement, as increased levels of social interaction by members; that is, less active mem-
bers becoming more active.
The current research
Recent research [32] identified racist riots occurring in Sydney in 2005 (known as the Cronulla
Riots) as a highly significant socio-political event for the online community Stormfront Down-
under. The riots were found to be associated with changes in the social identity content of the
online community. Detailed analysis of the language used by the members of the online com-
munity, demonstrated that norms, emotions, and key concerns of the group significantly
changed in the aftermath of the riots suggesting a sharpening and crystallisation of the collec-
tive identity of the community towards becoming more blatantly anti-Muslim. In the current
research, we first seek to establish whether the riots had any longer-term effects on the internal
cohesion of the same online community, Stormfront Downunder, and then test whether these
effects can be found in other similar online communities (in relation to offline events signifi-
cant to them).
Racist riots in Sydney as a significant event for the far-right online
community Stormfront Downunder
The Cronulla Riots occurred in the Sydney beach suburb of Cronulla on December 11, 2005 in
the form of violent demonstrations against Australians of Muslim backgrounds. The riots
were sparked by an earlier altercation between several Middle Eastern beachgoers and Anglo-
Saxon lifesavers. What initially started as a protest ‘to reclaim the beaches’, quickly escalated to
violence when about 40 people attacked a man of Middle Eastern appearance. The violence
during the riots resulted in more than 25 injured people and destruction to property. Impor-
tantly, members of local white supremacist groups and radical right-wing political parties were
present at the riots and seen distributing pamphlets [33, 34]. Going beyond injury to people
and property, the events have a deeper significance in the Australian context, representing the
beginning of intense debates in the public arena about the meaning of being Australian in
today’s multicultural society [32]. A key aspect in the context of this research is that the riots
represent an unprecedented blatant and violent public expression of anti-Muslim sentiment in
modern Australia.
Using the Cronulla Riots as the reference point for the online community Stormfront
Downunder, we first sought to establish whether the increase in the levels of activity in the
sub-forum after the riots was statistically significant. Second, we tested whether group cohe-
sion significantly increased after the riots and whether its indicators remained high in the fol-
lowing months and years. Specifically, we predicted increases in the indicators of group
cohesion after the riots as follows:
1. Attraction of the individual to the group: we expected to find more individual connections
between group members, and those levels to be maintained in the longer term.
2. Bonding: we expected to find more connections within the group between the highly active
members (both old and new members).
PLOS ONE Group cohesion in online far-right communities
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3. Unification: we expected fragmented conversations to become unified under shared
threads–thus more members would interact via fewer threads, rather than interacting
under many smaller threads.
4. Engagement: we expected inactive members to become active (re-engagement), and new
members to have comparable or higher levels of activity than existing active members.
Identifying significant events for online far-right communities in other
contexts (South Africa and Britain)
To determine whether the same effects can be found in other national contexts in similar
online communities, we analysed data from Stormfront South Africa and Stormfront Britain.
Given that our initial study on Stormfront Downunder is a natural experiment conducted out-
side the laboratory, we did not expect that data from different socio-political and cultural con-
texts, related to different events, and from different populations to provide exact replications
of the findings. Rather, these studies are closer to ‘constructive replications’ [35] where several
new elements are introduced and a similar (but not identical) effect is expected. These analyses
were conducted before and after significant events in each of the respective national contexts.
We identified two possible significant local socio-political events in the context of the far-right
movement in South Africa and respectively the UK by applying several criteria. We established
these criteria based on the theoretical points that we applied in our analysis of the Cronulla
Riots as a significant local event for the far-right movement in Australia. These criteria are: a)
there is ideological alignment between the drivers of the event/collective action and the online
community, whereby the event involves some form of collective action by a group that is ideo-
logically aligned to the online community; b) there is some degree of intergroup conflict, that
is, the event is underpinned by intergroup conflict between the group ideologically aligned to
the online community and an outgroup; c) the collective goals driving the group’s action ‘in
real life’ are also shared by the online community (in the Cronulla Riots the action was about
‘reclaiming the beach’ from a cultural outgroup; similar events may be about claiming of
reclaiming of political power, rights, status, etc.); and d) there is a sense of group achievement
brought by the event or perceived group success, that is, the outcome of collective action has a
positive connotation for the online community (in the case of the Cronulla Riots, the sense of
achievement was likely derived from the perception that the riots represented an important act
of rebellion against a system promoting multiculturalism with the sense of importance being
enhanced by the significant media attention). Using these criteria, we identified the following
socio-political events in the context of South Africa and the UK (based on the assessment that
they meet as meeting at least one of the criteria):
1. Protest against the name change from Pretoria to Tshwane in May 2005 (Stormfront South
Africa). In this event, thousands of protesters marched against the decision to rename the
city (Tshwane in Setswana language means ‘we are the same’). The local event represents an
attempt to maintain or re-claim status by the white community, a goal which is ideologically
consistent with the South African far-right movement. The action was driven by intergroup
conflict between supporters and opponents of the change, but unlike the case of the Cro-
nulla Riots, there was no violence between the groups. Also, the collective action did not
result in a reversing of the decision to change the name back to Pretoria, so it is plausible
that the sense of group achievement was reduced compared to the Cronulla Riots.
2. The far-right gaining political representation in the UK and the Assembly of London elections
in May 2008 (Stormfront Britain). In this event, the far-right British National Party (BNP)
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had an historic win, gaining 30 seats in the local elections and for the first-time gaining
representation in the Assembly of London. This event represents a successful claiming of
political power and legitimacy and therefore it is likely that it elicited a sense of group
achievement in the Stormfront Britain online community. However, (as a point of differ-
ence from the Cronulla Riots) the achievement was brought about via a democratic process
where intergroup competition rather than hostile intergroup conflict was salient.
Method
We conducted a natural experiment (using a quasi-experimental paradigm) where, the experi-
mental manipulation was introduced by the Cronulla Riots as significant socio-political event
for the far-right community in Australia, and thus to the online community Stormfront
Downunder. For the other national contexts, as significant events for Stormfront South Africa
and Stormfront Britain online communities, we used the 2005 Tshwane protest and respec-
tively the 2008 UK election.
Statement of ethics
This research was approved by the Monash University Research Ethics Committee, Project ID:
8420.
Data collection
We analysed data from three Stormfront sub-forums: Downunder (Australia) for our main
study, and South Africa and Britain (UK) to see if the effects found in the main study can be
replicated. For each of the three sub-forums, we examined the following metadata: user identi-
fier number, thread identifier number, as well as the time and date of each post, and word
count for each post. Other content, such as graphics, video or audio was not retrieved. For this
study, we analysed all posts made to the general discussion section of each of the sub-forums
over the periods specified. These were: Stormfront Downunder, https://www.stormfront.org/
forum/f116/ from 13/09/2001 to 06/05/2015, (75,795 posts, 2,520 anonymous). Stormfront
South Africa, https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f113/ from 13/09/2001 to 06/05/2015,
(49,436 posts, 870 anonymous), Stormfront Britain, https://www.stormfront.org/forum/f92/
from 13/09/2001 to 06/05/2015 (210,117 posts, 1,495 anonymous).
In Stormfront Downunder, we first examined variations in levels of online activity and then
variations in indicators of group cohesion to see whether there were significant changes in
relation to the riots. Specifically, we examined indicators of activity and connections between
members, weekly, over the six months before, during, and after the riots. These were: the num-
ber of posts made (overall activity), connections per member (individual attraction to group),
connections per member for the 50 most active members (bonding between most committed
group members), posts per thread (unification of members interacting under the same
threads), and the number of active members (engagement). For this analysis, posts were
grouped into weeks (7 days) centred on the first day of the Cronulla Riots, December 11th,
2005. The week of the riots was denoted as Week 0. Posts include both users’ own initial posts
and replies to posts by other users. Raw (typically count) data was used to test the hypotheses
without any seasonal adjustment of activity time series. To test the sensitivity of our analysis to
the choice of a 7-day week, the same analysis was performed with week lengths of 3, 14 and 28
days, which showed that the substantive conclusions of our analysis were unaffected.
All posts were included in the analysis of activity, such as the number of posts per week (Fig
1), and the number of posts per thread. The distribution of word counts in all sub forums was
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positively skewed, therefore the hypothesis tests report results for log-transformed data, sum-
mary statistics, however, report raw data. Anonymous posts were omitted from the social net-
work analysis and count of active members as these could not be attributed to specific authors.
For Stormfront Downunder, anonymous posts comprised only 3.3% of the cohort and did not
significantly differ in average word count (M = 104.64, SD = 166.26) for members, and
(M = 110.18, SD = 198.33) for anonymous posts as shown by the two-sided t-test, t(2686) =
0.32, p = 0.747, d = 0.03.
For Stormfront South Africa, anonymous posts comprised 1.8% of posts. There was a sig-
nificant difference in word count, due in part to the presence of several extremely long posts
by members (M = 213.66, SD = 374.21), and (M = 127.04, SD = 283.60) for anonymous posts,
(two-sided) t(1068) = -12.31, p<< 0.001, d = -0.23. Stormfront Britain contained 0.7% anony-
mous posts with a small but statistically significant difference in post length, (M = 99.78,
SD = 178.36) for member posts, and (M = 111.57, SD = 145.34) for anonymous, (two-sided) t
(5588) = 10.84, p<< 0.001, d = 0.07. However, for both South Africa and Britain sub-forums,
these anonymous posts only comprise a very small proportion of each cohort, therefore we
conclude that the omission of anonymous posts does not unduly bias these analyses.
Further information on each of the figures, hypothesis tests, as well as the R scripts used to
analyse the data from all three sub-forums are presented in the S1 Data. The analyses of Storm-
front South Africa and Stormfront Britain data were pre-registered at AsPredicted.com (public
pre-registration: https://aspredicted.org/9j8gi.pdf).
Results
Differences in the activity of the online communities before and after the
events
There is a significant increase in Stormfront Downunder activity during the period immedi-
ately before, during, and in the aftermath of the riots. Fig 1 shows the level of online activity
between 2001 and 2018 as the number of posts made by group members each week. The peak
in posts late in 2005 coincides with the riots in early December 2005. Around the time of the
riots, an immediate increase in online activity can be observed—for example, during the six
months (26 weeks) immediately before the riots, members made, on average, 187.88 posts per
week (SD = 52.06). Over the 6 months following the riots (excluding the two weeks of the
riots) members made 329.85 posts per week on average (SD = 81.68), representing a significant
increase as confirmed by a one-sided t-test, t(42) = 7.47, p< 0.0001, d = 1.44. As Fig 1 shows,
these high levels of activity were maintained over the whole of 2006, and gradually dissipated
over subsequent years. Because the number of posts was significantly greater over the period
immediately before and after the riots than at any other time in the forum’s history (even
when controlling for seasonal trends), we used the riots as the reference point to assess changes
in group cohesion of the online community.
For Stormfront South Africa, there is not a significant change in levels of activity, as indi-
cated by posts per week, from 6 months before (M = 258.38, SD = 80.65) to 6 months after
(M = 277.04, SD = 159.22) the Tshwane Protests, (one-sided) t(37) = 0.54, p = 0.30, d = 0.15.
However, as Fig 2 shows, there is a spike in activity post-Tshwane Protests. Performing the
same hypothesis test, but over a shorter period (3 months = 13 weeks) shows that there is a sig-
nificant increase in forum activity after the Tshwane Protests, from an average number of
posts per week during the 3 months prior to the riots of 285.23 (SD = 86.56) to an average of
408.15 (SD = 109.63) over the 3 months post riots, (one-sided) t(23) = 3.17, p = 0.002, d = 1.06.
For Stormfront Britain, there is a spike in forum activity around the time of the UK elections.
However, no significant changes are detected over the intervals 6 months pre (M = 2539.96,
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SD = 309.35) and post (M = 2092.69, SD = 356.52) elections, (one-sided) t(49) = -4.83, p = 1, d
= -1.12, or at 3 months pre (M = 2527.92, SD = 277.47) and post (M = 2243.39, SD = 145.67)
elections, (one-sided) t(18) = -3.27, p = 1, d = -1.08.
Attraction of the individual to the group
Individual attraction was captured by the number of connections between members before
and after the riots. This social network was constructed using a two-mode concept [36],
whereby members were considered linked if each had posted to the same thread within a spec-
ified time interval, set as one week for our analysis. Fig 3 shows the average number of connec-
tions between all members of the Stormfront Downunder, calculated weekly, during the two
years before the riots and two years after the riots. The average number of connections
between members increased significantly after the riots, from an average of 8.50 (SD = 3.00)
connections per member per week during the 6 months before the riots, to 10.39 (SD = 2.33)
connections per member per week during the 6 months after the riots, (one-sided) t(47) =
2.53, p = 0.007, d = 0.67.
In Stormfront South Africa, there is no significant change in the number of connections
between members over the 6 months pre (M = 8.05, SD = 2.79) and post (M = 7.31, SD = 3.85)
Tshwane Protests, (one-sided) t(45) = -0.79, p = 0.78, d = -0.22. However, over the shorter
term (3 months), there is an increase in social connections pre (M = 8.32, SD = 2.50) and post
(M = 10.01, SD = 3.15) Tshwane protests, (one-sided) t(22) = 1.51, p = 0.07, d = 0.58. In Storm-
front Britain, there is no significant change in the number of connections between members
pre- and post-elections over the longer term (6 months) pre (M = 29.17, SD = 5.14) and post
(M = 23.99, SD = 4.77), (one-sided) t(49) = -3.77, p = 0.99, d = -0.93, or shorter term (3
Fig 1. Number of posts per week to the Stormfront Downunder sub-forum 2001 to 2015. Increased posting activity is observed
around the Cronulla Riots in Sydney, December 2005.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g001
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months) pre (M = 27.77, SD = 4.32) and post (M = 25.26, SD = 3.15), (one-sided) t(22) = -1.68,
p = 0.95, d = -0.64.
Bonding between online community members–reinvigoration after the
events
Bonding between the members of the online communities was measured by members’ posting
activity and the creation of connections between existing active members and new members.
We expected to find more connections in the social network between the most committed
members of the online community. To examine this phenomenon, the social network formed
by the 50 most active members over the period starting one year before the riots and ending
one year after the riots was constructed at weekly intervals. In Stormfront Downunder, the
reinvigoration of the online community after the riots due to the bonding of old and new
members is evident in Fig 4, which shows snapshots of the social network formed at three
points in time: before, during and after the riots. Each vertex represents a member of the
online community, shown in order by the date of their first post to the forum (thus Member 1
is the longest standing member while Member 50 is the most recent). As Fig 4 illustrates, at 6
months before the riots, existing members were moderately well-connected. Among all mem-
bers of the social network there was an average of 15.59 (SD = 10.86) connections per member.
During the week of the riots the network had become highly connected, with an average of
106.10 (SD = 75.43) connections per member over the whole network. Importantly, new
Fig 2. The number of posts per week in the Stormfront Downunder, Stormfront South Africa and Stormfront Britain sub-forums. The significant event relative to
each community is indicated at the time of the event.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g002
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members were communicating with long-standing members. Finally, at 6 months after the
riots, a high level of communication between members had been maintained, with an average
of 26.09 (SD = 26.45) connections per member. The connections between older and newer
members were preserved, which shows that new members were contributing to the renewed
activity in the group.
Fig 3. The average number of social network connections in Stormfront Downunder per member, weekly, from two-
years prior to two-years post Cronulla Riots.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g003
Fig 4. Snapshots of the social networks in Stormfront Downunder formed at 6 months (during Week 26) pre- and post-Cronulla Riots, and during the week of
the riots by the 50 most active members over one-year prior to one-year post riots.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g004
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The high level of connectivity among new members joining around the time of the riots
and soon after (suggesting reinvigoration of the group) is also shown in Fig 5. The heat map
shows the number of each member’s network connections for each week from one year (52
weeks) before, to one year after the riots. New members were the most active members over
the period analysed, having a high level of initial activity, shown as lighter areas on the heat
map. By contrast, the longest standing members who joined the group before the riots did not
show the same level of high initial activity and connectivity.
A small group of active, well-connected, new members joined Stormfront South Africa
around the time of the Tshwane Protests, and remained active and connected with longer
standing members at 13 weeks (S1 Fig in the S1 Data). However, reinvigoration of Stormfront
Britain corresponding to the UK Elections is not evident (S2 Fig in the S1 Data).
Unification in the online communities
We predicted that after the event, unification would be reflected in fragmented conversations
converging under shared threads–thus more members interacting more frequently through
fewer threads. In Stormfront Downunder, our analysis shows that although the number of
posts was greater immediately before and after the riots than at any other time in the forum’s
history, the increased participation by members resulted in a greater cohesion of the group,
rather than fragmentation. We used the number of participants posting to the same thread
each week, posts per thread, as an indicator of group unification. Fig 6 shows that group unifi-
cation was greatest close to the riots and preserved over the longer term. Using the period
from 2001 to 2004 as a baseline, having an average of 5.04 (SD = 3.32) posts per thread, the
increase in unification was significant (p< 0.01), for a one-sided t-test over the years 2005 to
2008 (S1 Data in S1 Table).
Analysis over the same time period shows that a similar effect, but over a longer duration, is
evident for Stormfront South Africa in the years following the Tshwane Protests (S3 Fig in the
S1 Data, S2 Table). Comparison of posts per thread by in the years 2008 to 2013 with those
prior (years 2004–2007) shows a significant increase in 2008, the year of the UK Elections, and
corresponding with a spike in sub-forum activity (S4 Fig in the S1 Data, S3 Table). However,
this increase is not maintained in subsequent years.
Engagement within the online communities
We examined variations in levels of engagement of the online community as reflected by levels
of activity by newer members, compared with those of longer standing. Fig 7 shows the num-
ber of Stormfront Downunder members participating in the online community, weekly, from
two years before the riots until two years after the riots. Members were deemed to be partici-
pating if they made at least one post during any given week. Members who joined the group at
any time before the riots were classified as existing members. New members were those who
joined in the week of the riots or after. As illustrated in Fig 7, the level of activity of existing
members declined after the riots. New members were driving the activity of the online com-
munity after the riots and the activity of these new members remained at a similar level even
two years after the riots.
In Stormfront South Africa, a similar effect, but to a smaller degree, can be observed post
Tshwane Protests (S5 Fig in the S1 Data). There is no significant increase in new members
joining Stormfront Britain immediately post UK Elections (S6 Fig in the S1 Data), with the
gradual increase in new members and decline in older members being more reflective of natu-
ral attrition and renewal within the sub-forum.
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Fig 5. Heatmap showing the connections between the 50 most active members weekly, from two-years prior, to two-years
post Cronulla Riots.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g005
Fig 6. Posts per thread per week for all members of Stormfront Downunder, 2001 to 2015.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g006
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Discussion and conclusion
Our findings provide evidence on how significant socio-political events ‘in real life’ can unite
and reinvigorate particular white supremacist online communities. In the case of Stormfront
Downunder, local race riots in Sydney had strong positive and long-lasting effects on the inter-
nal cohesion of the online community–after the riots, the community becomes more cohesive.
In particular, the online community becomes more connected and reinvigorated primarily
because, during and shortly after the riots, a) it attracted highly active and group-minded new
members, and b) the frequency of interactions between the members increased. Regarding
members’ engagement with the online community, we found that existing members, regard-
less of their previous levels of participation, became less active after the riots. By contrast, new
members were driving the activity in the online community after the riots. The pattern of
interactions between the most active members shows that during and after the riots, bonding
increased, not only between existing members, but also between existing and new members.
This latter type of bonding is particularly significant because it suggests exchanges and knowl-
edge transfer that may drive changes in the collective identity of the group (that is, what mem-
bers collectively stand for, their shared goals, values, and norms). This finding is consistent
with previous research based on textual analysis of post content showing that this particular
online community did indeed change after the riots–the group norms became more inclusive
of ideologically similar others, but more exclusive of ethnic and religious outgroups; impor-
tantly, a stronger and clearer anti-Muslim stance was adopted by the group [30].
In the aftermath of the riots, the members of Stormfront Downunder communicated more
with each other–that is, individual attraction to the group, as reflected in the average number
Fig 7. Number of active members per week from two-years prior, to two-years post Cronulla Riots, by whether the member joined
pre- or post-riots.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0230302.g007
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of connections between group members, peaked during the week of the riots and remained
elevated for a long period after the riots. The group also became highly unified after the riots
when, more people interacted under fewer discussion threads. Thus, rather than members
talking about many different things, there were more members collectively discussing the
same issues. This dynamic suggests that a shared understanding of matters relevant to the
group might may have increased consensualisation of group’s norms and values [37]. It
implies that the legacy of the riots is group reinvigoration (thus going beyond increased group
cohesion per se), possibly due to the attraction and retention of new highly active and group-
minded members who are therefore more likely to maintain cohesion in the long-term. It is
plausible that some existing and new members of the online community directly participated
in the riots. For these members, their direct contribution to the collective action undertaken in
the pursuit of shared group goals (based on beliefs in line with a white supremacist ideology)
could have led to an even more heightened sense of achievement on the group’s behalf–hence
their increased efficacy within the group long after the riots.
Our analysis demonstrates that, in the case of the online community Stormfront Downun-
der, significant local socio-political events can have strengthening and potentially transforma-
tive effects. These findings are consistent with theoretical propositions that emphasise the
power of conflictual interactions between groups to shape and re-shape collective identities;
that is, these interactions enable ‘newly empowered’ definitions of collective selfhood to
emerge [38–40]. In the case of the Cronulla Riots, their evident direct and immediate effects
are localised at the level of the Australian community and mostly consist of opening a national
debate on national identity and nationalism.
However, the analyses of data from far-right online communities in South Africa and the
UK show mixed results. Some similar effects on group cohesion are found in these online com-
munities, in particular in Stormfront South Africa, but the effects are smaller in magnitude
and less enduring. Specifically, in the case of the South African Tshwane Protests, their effects
are maintained for approximately 3 months in the case of members’ attraction to group and
for approximately 6 months for unification (whereas for Stormfront Downunder, both these
effects are maintained for much longer than 6 months). For the other indicators of group cohe-
sion (bonding and engagement), no significant effects are detected. In the case of Stormfront
Britain, coinciding with the UK 2008 election success, there is a short-lived spike in online
social interactions in Stormfront Britain, but no longer-term effects are observed in any of the
indicators of group cohesion. In both contexts, the events do not seem to produce a significant
surge in new, highly active members, thus no group reinvigoration occurs.
All three studies employed identical designs to test the effects of significant socio-political
events ‘in real life’ on the group cohesion of online far-right communities. These were based
around significant events for each community that were similar (in the sense that they shared
at least one of the properties of: ideological alignment to the white supremacist movement in
the respective context, and presence of intergroup conflict, collective group goals, and per-
ceived group success). However, our results seem to reflect dynamics that are representative of
the different socio-political contexts of Australia, South Africa, and the UK. These differences
in the results are useful to identify particular aspects that can determine whether a socio-politi-
cal event has the potential to become impactful or not. For instance, our findings show that the
greatest and most enduring impact was that of the Cronulla Riots in Australia. These effects
may be explained by considering the particular significance of the riots in the context of local
politics and intergroup relationships at the time. That is, historically, the riots represent the
first time in Australia that the debate around national identity explicitly brought strong anti-
Muslim attitudes into the public focus. The anti-Muslim sentiment has since become one of
the main drivers of the far-right movement in Australia [41], with the actions of the Australian
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white supremacist responsible for the 2019 Christchurch attacks (who was at least partly radi-
calised online, 8) being a poignant illustration of this trend. The synergy between the local
political trends and the ideological content driving the event (a nascent and growing anti-Mus-
lim sentiment) in the Australian context is not present to the same degree in the South African
and British contexts.
Furthermore, while the events in each of the three contexts are underpinned by various
degrees of intergroup conflict, open intergroup violence is only present in the case of the Cro-
nulla Riots. This suggests that events that manifest as more extreme forms of collective actions
(which are also likely to attract more media attention) have a greater impact on associated
online communities. One implication of strong intergroup conflict is that it enables the opti-
mal conditions for increased meta-contrast between opposing groups to occur, so that the out-
group is more directly identifiable from the ingroup’s perspective. These conditions may have,
in turn, enabled communications between members of Stormfront Downunder to more effec-
tively drive the process of consensualisation [34] and therefore enable a more robust and func-
tional re-definition of the collective identity of the online community (providing clarity about
who they are as a group and who they stand against). In other words, increased group cohesion
meant that members strongly bonded under a shared collective (white supremacist) identity
where the increasingly strong anti-Muslim focus [32] ensured that the collective identity
stayed relevant for a longer period of time. Although similar patterns are observed in the
Stormfront South Africa online community, reinvigoration driven by new members (joining
immediately after the event) seems unique to the Stormfront Downunder. This suggests that
in the Australian context, the Cronulla Riots were more effective in mobilising a social identity
highly consistent with norms of far-right activism. Stormfront Downunder provided an ideal
outlet for these identities to be enacted and the involvement of highly active new members
ensured the long-lasting effects of the riots in the Australian context.
Our findings suggest that local events, which are significant for the far-right movement,
may have a pervasive and enduring legacy on local online communities under certain condi-
tions. The differences in our results across the three communities suggest that, such events can
be particularly effective when they are more aligned to current trends and attitudes in society
and when they represent strong and potentially violent intergroup conflict where the opposite
sides are unambiguous. In other words, socio-political events driven by attitudes both towards
a group’s ‘enemy’ who is easy to identify (exploiting intergroup conflict) and which are more
strongly endorsed by the societal trends at the time (thereby ensuring perceptions of group
success) appear to have the greatest effect on the online communities studied. Democratic
societies are increasingly threatened by white supremacy and other divisive ideologies that are
spread online and energise whole communities of like-minded extremists. To protect the
groups that are the most vulnerable from attacks by those affiliated to such extremist online
communities, governments need to devise more effective prevention measures–measures
which are based on an understanding of what unifies and strengthens online communities




S1 Table. T-test, H1: That average posts per thread per week over the years immediately
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